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 Application of the law to the facts in these cases shows the district court erred by 
concluding that handing off the citation book to a second officer so he could complete the 
citation for failure to signal a lane change constituted an abandonment of the traffic stop.  
(Appellant’s brief, pp. 4-7.)  Both McGraw and Killeen contend the district court did not 
err, because handing the citation book to a second officer for completion added time to 
the stop.  (Killeen Response, pp. 7-8; McGraw Response, pp. 7-8.)  Killeen further argues 
that Officer Green extended the stop by having her exit the car.  (Killeen Response, pp. 8-
9.)  Application of the law to the facts shows neither argument to have merit.  Because the 
officers reasonably pursued the initial purpose of the stop, the stop was not unlawfully 
extended. 
 
B. Handing The Citation Book To A Different Officer Did Not Abandon The Traffic 
Stop 
 
 The Idaho Supreme Court has held that if an officer abandons the purpose of a 
traffic stop, reasonable suspicion no longer supports his actions.  State v. Linze, 
161 Idaho 605, 609, 389 P.3d 150, 154 (2016); State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 409, 
283 P.3d 722, 726 (2012); see also State v. Aguirre, 141 Idaho 560, 112 P.3d 848 (Ct. 
App. 2005).  However, the “stop remains a reasonable seizure while the officer diligently 
pursues the purpose of the stop, to which that reasonable suspicion is related.” Linze, 
161 Idaho at 609, 389 P.3d at 154. 
-- --- -----------
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 In Linze the Court held that the officer abandoned the purpose of the traffic stop 
“by delaying the traffic stop for two and a half minutes while performing a back-up 
function for a drug dog sweep.”  Linze, 161 Idaho at 609, 389 P.3d at 154.  For that two 
and one-half minutes, the police were pursuing a different investigation and were not 
pursuing the purposes of the traffic stop.  In contrast, here the exchange of the citation 
book was not a separate investigation that abandoned the purposes of the stop, but was 
rather an act that assured the purposes of the stop were not abandoned. 
 McGraw and Killeen argue that handing off the citation book constituted an 
abandonment because it “added time to the stop.”  (Killeen Response, pp. 7-8 (actions 
were unconstitutional because they “added time to the stop”); McGraw Response, p. 7 
(handing off citation book “delayed, i.e., added time, to the stop”).)  This argument fails 
because everything the officer does adds time to the stop.  Walking to the stopped car 
adds time to the stop.  Securing the driver’s license, insurance and registration adds time 
to the stop.  Running the driver’s and passenger’s identification through dispatch adds 
time to the stop.  Writing the ticket adds time to the stop.  Double-checking to make sure 
the name on the citation is spelled correctly adds time to the stop.  Whether an act “added 
time to the stop” is not by itself an abandonment inquiry.  Rather, as set forth in Linze, an 
abandonment is a “deviation from the original purpose of the stop” that lengthens the 
time of the stop.  Linze, 161 Idaho at ___, 389 P.3d at 153.  Handing the citation book to 
another officer to write the citation was not a “deviation” or abandonment of the purposes 
of the stop, but was the opposite—an effort to complete the purposes of the stop.   
 Killeen’s and McGraw’s argument to the contrary—that the detention was 
unconstitutionally delayed because the exchange of the citation book was an 
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abandonment of the traffic stop—is without merit.  “[A]n investigative detention must be 
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.”  
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983).  “[T]he tolerable duration of police inquiries 
in the traffic-stop context is determined by the seizure’s ‘mission’—to address the traffic 
violation that warranted the stop, and attend to related safety concerns.”  Rodriguez v. 
United States, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 1614 (2015).  “Authority for the seizure thus 
ends when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably should have been—
completed.”  Id.  “In assessing whether a detention is too long in duration to be justified 
as an investigative stop, we consider it appropriate to examine whether the police 
diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel their 
suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to detain the defendant.”  United 
States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985).   
 Here the traffic citation was pursued diligently; that McGraw and Killeen have 
come up with a way the police could conceivably have been more efficient by getting 
things done a few seconds quicker does not show that the officers behaved unreasonably.   
A court making this assessment [of “whether a detention is too long in 
duration to be justified”] should take care to consider whether the police 
are acting in a swiftly developing situation, and in such cases the court 
should not indulge in unrealistic second-guessing.  A creative judge 
engaged in post hoc evaluation of police conduct can almost always 
imagine some alternative means by which the objectives of the police 
might have been accomplished.  But the fact that the protection of the 
public might, in the abstract, have been accomplished by ‘less intrusive’ 
means does not, itself, render the search unreasonable. 
 
Sharpe, 470 U.S. at 686–87 (internal quotations, citations and brackets omitted).  
Killeen’s and McGraw’s argument that the police could have been more efficient and 
possibly shaved seconds off the process of writing the citation by not handing off the 
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citation book, by not turning off the flashing lights, by taking a shorter route around the 
police car, and by focusing on writing the citation to the exclusion of awareness of his 
surroundings amounts to nothing more than an invitation to engage in unrealistic second-
guessing. 
 The district court erred by concluding the officers abandoned the purpose of the 
traffic stop by handing off the citation book for completion of the citation.  Such an act 
was within the scope of the purposes of the stop, which included writing a citation, and 
not a deviation from the purposes of the traffic stop.  Likewise, McGraw’s and Killeen’s 
post hoc evaluation of the officers’ efficiency in writing the citation is an improper 
invitation to second-guess the officer’s conduct by imagined alternative means by which 
the officers may have pursued the investigation.   
  Killeen then doubles down on the second-guessing in a manner that cements the 
error of her, and McGraw’s, argument by asserting that Officer Green “deviated from the 
initial purpose of the stop” by removing her and McGraw from the vehicle because this 
act “facilitated the dog sniff.”  (Killeen Response, pp. 8-9.)  However, it is well 
established that an officer may order an occupant of a stopped vehicle to exit the car “as a 
matter of course.”  Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 410 (1997) (citing Pennsylvania v. 
Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977)).  That a perfectly legitimate and constitutional act in 
the course of a traffic stop “facilitated the dog sniff” does not make it a deviation from the 
purposes of the stop.  Indeed, by that standard the stop itself “facilitated” the dog sniff 
because such a sniff could not have occurred but for the stop.   
A “deviation” from the purposes of the traffic stop must necessarily be an act that 
the officers could not take in the course of an ordinary stop.  See Linze, 161 Idaho at 608-
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09, 389 P.3d at 153-54 (officer abandoned traffic stop by participating in drug dog sniff).  
The acts of handing the citation book to another officer so that officer could complete the 
ticket, turning off emergency lights, walking around a car, and being observant of 
surroundings while writing the citation are all acts legitimately within the scope of the 
traffic stop.  Therefore, the officers did not deviate from or abandon the purposes of the 
stop and the district court erred by concluding otherwise. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 The state requests that this Court reverse the district court’s order granting 
suppression and remand for further proceedings. 
 DATED this 22nd day of September, 2017. 
 
 
      _/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen___________ 
      KENNETH K. JORGENSEN 
      Deputy Attorney General 
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